A client-side approach for privacy-preserving identity federation by Sébastien Canard et al.
IDIS (2009) 2:269–295
DOI 10.1007/s12394-009-0024-4
A client-side approach for privacy-preserving
identity federation
Sébastien Canard · Eric Malville · Jacques Traoré
Received: 1 April 2009 / Accepted: 26 July 2009 / Published online: 1 October 2009
© Identity Journal Limited 2009
Abstract Providing Single Sign-On (SSO) between service providers and en-
abling service providers to share user personal attributes are critical for both
users to benefit from a seamless access to their services, and service providers
to realize new business opportunities. Today, however, the users have several
independent, partial identities spread over different service providers. Provid-
ing SSO and attribute sharing requires that links (federations) are established
between (partial) identities. In SAML 2.0 (Maler et al. 2003), the links between
identities are stored and managed at the network side by the identity providers
(network-side identity federation). This model prevents the service providers
from mass-correlating the partial identities they have, but the users must
fully trust the identity providers. In this paper, we propose a complementary
approach where the users have a full control of the links between their partial
identities. It is a client-side identity federation approach, which relies on the
introduction of a new cryptographic tool, called invariable partially blind
signature scheme, that may be of independent interest.
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Introduction
As Internet is a prime vehicle for business and personal interactions, more
and more organizations, today, provide their customers with personalized
on line services. This requires that the users have, at each service provider
(SP), an identity associated to credentials for authentication and attributes
(personal information) for personalization. The users have, therefore, several
independent, partial identities spread over SPs. The relative independence
of these partial identities enables the user to control, to some degree, the
exposure of personal information complying this way with a certain level
of privacy and, in particular, with the collection limitation privacy principle
stating that there should be limits to the collection of personal data and that
any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means (Liberty Alliance
http://www.projectliberty.org/).
Providing Single Sign-On (SSO) between SPs and enabling SPs to share
user personal attributes are critical for both users to benefit from a seamless
access to their services, and SPs to realize new business opportunities. This
requires that federation links are established between (partial) identities. The
very nature of these links, and the way they are established and managed are
critical with respect to privacy.
In what we call the network-side identity federation model in this paper,
the identity federation links are managed by identity providers (IdPs) in the
network and the authentication of the user is performed by the IdPs. The
identity federation links are used by the IdPs in authentication claims or
assertions to reference the user in the namespace of the SPs.
The identities of a user can be federated using a unique identifier shared
by the IdPs and all the SPs. In the OpenID 1.x (OpenID http://openid.net/)
approach, for instance, the users have one or more OpenID identifiers (URI)
at one or more IdPs. These identifiers are presented by the users to the SPs and
enable the SPs to determine which IdP the authentication must be delegated
to. Since the users have to remember their OpenID URI, they usually create
only few OpenID identifiers. This brings to a situation where a same OpenID
identifier is used to access several SPs. Should these SPs be malicious, they
could collude to mass-correlate the users’ personal attributes each of them
have and compromise this way the collection limitation privacy principle.1 In
this model, the users must fully trust both the IdP and the SPs.
The identity federations can also be established in a more privacy-friendly
way. In SAML 2.0 (Maler et al. 2003) for instance, IdPs use pseudonyms
1The version 2.0 of OpenID enables the users to provide the URL of the IdP instead of their
own OpenID URI. Therefore, disclosure of the OpenID URI is not mandatory anymore but the
specifications do not give any recommendation on the way an IdP should reference a user in the
namespace of the SPs.
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or aliases (nameID) to reference the users in the SPs’ namespace and these
pseudonyms differ from one SP to another. This means that the SPs cannot
directly reference this user in the namespace of each other, preventing, this
way, malicious SPs from colluding to mass-correlate users’ identities. However,
in this approach, federation aliases are still stored and managed by the IdPs in
the network. This requires that the users put sufficient trust in the IdPs (and
the network) to entrust them with the management of the federation links,
since this information would enable the IdPs to correlate the partial identities
the users have at the SPs.
The identity selector, like CardSpace (http://netfx3.com/content/
windowscardspacehome.aspx) from Microsoft or Higgins, is a new concept that
comes as a software component installed and running on the users’ devices. It
aims to help users better understand and represent their digital identities and,
therefore, to simplify the management and the use of digital identities. The
identity selectors support the usual network-side identity federation model.
But they also introduce a new model, that we call a client-centric identity
model, where the IdPs functions are all transferred to the user’s device;
Identity federations and authentications are managed and performed at the
client side. This approach gives the users a full control on the federation links
and enable them to keep their identities separate. But, at the same time, it
requires that SPs in the network put sufficient trust in the user’s device to
accept authentication claims provided by the IdP hosted on the device.
In this paper we propose an intermediary model between the network-side
identity federation model where all the IdP’s functions are all performed in
the network and the client-centric identity approach where these functions
are all performed in the user’s device. This model is an evolution of the
SAML 2.0 identity federation model based on a new partially blind signature
scheme. In this model, only the management of the identity federation links
are transferred to the user’s device and the actual authentication of the user is
performed by IdPs in the network. This model gives the users a full control on
the identity federation links while preserving the trust relationships established
between SPs and IdPs that enable SPs to accept authentication claims provided
by the IdPs.
The Section “Identity federation: towards a Client-side approach” gives
an overview of the client-side identity federation approach we propose. This
approach relies on blind signature schemes that have been initially introduced
by Chaum (1982, 1983). The existing blind signature schemes must be adapted
and the Section “Invariable partially blind signature schemes” presents the
adaptation we propose. Note that our new cryptographic building block,
called invariable partially blind signature, may be of independent interest. In
Section “Client-side identity federation and SSO protocols”, we describe in
details the client-side identity federation and single sign-on protocols and we
finally give some implementation considerations in Section “Implementation
considerations”.
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Identity federation: towards a Client-side approach
In this section, we first present the network-side identity federation model pro-
posed in the SAML 2.0 specifications and supported by the identity selectors,
and the new client-centric identity model introduced with the identity selector
concept. This section also clarifies the positioning of our client-side identity
federation model with regard to these existing models and shows why these
different models are complementary.
SAML 2.0: a full network-side identity federation model
Identity federations occur between identities at SP and identities at IdP, and
is based on the use of aliases (or pseudonyms). In the network-side identity
federation approach, the federation aliases are stored and managed by the IdP,
and can be, like in SAML 2.0, unique on a per-identity-federation basis across
all IdP and SPs (see Fig. 1). Each alias corresponds to a federation link between
an identity local to a SP and an identity local to an IdP (e.g. the pseudonym 123
is the federation link between the identities user@SPA and user@IdP). It is
a pseudo-random value (generated either by the IdP or the SP) that has no
discernible correspondence with the user’s identifiers and that represents the
user in the namespaces of the IdP and SP.
The first time a user uses a particular IdP to authenticate to a SP, the user
may federate her SP’s identity to her IdP’s identity. This identity federation
is done only once for a given user, a given IdP and a given SP. The general
principle of identity federation is the following (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 1 Server-side identity
federation
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Fig. 2 SAML 2.0 identity federation
1. The user accesses to a SP.
2. SP redirects the user to the IdP with an authentication request
AuthnRequest. This authentication request contains in particular a request
identifier, the date of the request and the identity of the SP.
3. IdP verifies the validity of the authentication request and authenticates
the user so as to retrieve her local identity at the IdP: user@idp. IdP
determines that the user user@idp has not yet federated her identity with
her identity at the SP. It, therefore, generates a new federation alias alias
and associates it to the local user identity for the SP. IdP finally generates
an authentication response AuthnResponse and signs it. This response
contains the federation alias alias and not the local identity user@idp of
the user.
4. The IdP redirects the user to the SP with the authentication response
AuthnResponse.
5. SP verifies the IdP’s signature on AuthnResponse and extracts alias. Since
there is no local identity corresponding to alias, SP asks the user whether
she wants to federate his local identity with her IdP’s identity. SP then
authenticates the user to retrieve the local identity user@sp and associates
it with the federation alias alias.
6. SP finally provides the user with the requested service. The identity
user@idp of the user at the IdP is now federated to her identity user@sp at
the SP with the federation alias alias.
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Once the identity federation is performed, the user can benefit from Single
Sign On (SSO) from the IdP to the SP; the user can authenticate to the IdP and
access the SP without any additional authentication. The SSO protocol relies
on the same general principle as the identity federation. The only differences
reside in the following two steps:
• during step 3, the IdP, after authenticating the user, retrieves the alias
corresponding to user@idp and associates to the requested SP. As before,
the IdP finally generates the authentication response AuthnResponse
including the alias and signs it;
• during step 5, the SP does not need to authenticate the user. It first extracts
the alias from the (valid) authentication request and uses this alias to
retrieve the identity of the user user@sp from his database.
Identity selector
Based on Kim Cameron’s laws of Identity (Cameron 2005), the identity
selector is a new concept materialized by a client software (e.g. Microsoft’s
CardSpace or Higgins) running on the user device, and whose goal is to
simplify the management of identities by the user. The basic principle relies
on the analogy with the billfold: the identity selector is a receptacle for
information cards, each of them representing a user identity. The basic idea
consists in symbolizing the act of authentication in order to make it more
natural: in order to authenticate to a SP and provide it personal information,
the user has just to present an information card.
The identity selector concept supports two identity federation models (see
Fig. 3). On the one hand, it supports the traditional network-side identity
federation model. The card, called managed card in this case, represents an
identity managed by an IdP in the network. Authentications and identity
federation links are controlled and managed by this IdP and, therefore, at
the network side. On the other hand, the identity selector concept introduces
a new model, a client-centric identity model, in which the card (called self-
issued card in this model) represents an identity created and managed locally
on the user’s device. The device plays the role of the IdP and the protection of
this identity fully relies on the security mechanisms available and (optionally)
activated locally. Authentications and identity federation links are, therefore,
managed at the client side.
Discussion on SAML 2.0 and the identity selector concept
SAML 2.0 provides a network-side identity federation model where both the
authentications and the identity federations are performed by IdPs at the
network side. The Identity Provider gives, for a given user, an alias that is
different from one SP to another and this alias is used by the IdPs in the
authentication claims it provides to the SPs to reference the user in each SPs’
namespace. SAML 2.0 provides a first level of protection of the user’s privacy
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Fig. 3 Infocard model
since there is no way for two corrupted service providers to collude and mass-
correlate the identities stored in their database. In most cases, this identity
federation approach can be deemed acceptable from a privacy standpoint
and the trust the users have in the IdPs in the network can be sufficient to
entrust them with the management of the identity federation links. But in
this approach, the federation aliases are stored and managed by the Identity
Provider in the network. The IdP has, therefore, all the information necessary
to correlate users’ identities. The network-side identity federation approach is,
therefore, more relevant when the partial identities are slightly independent
and when the damage that the correlation of these partial identities would
cause is limited. But some identities (health, government, bank...) are so
different and so critical that we think the user may refuse to entrust the
management of the links between these identities to the IdPs in the network.
The identity selector concept supports the network-side identity federation
model and introduces a new client-centric identity model where both the
authentication and identity federation functions are transferred from the
network to the user’s device. This new model proposed with the identity
selector concept gives more control to the user since the federation aliases are
controlled and managed by an identity provider residing in the user’s device. It,
therefore, provides an even stronger protection of the user’s privacy. However,
in this radical approach, authentications are performed at the client side and
the SP must put sufficient trust in the device to accept the authentication claims
it provides.
The client-side identity federation approach we propose (see Fig. 4) is an
intermediary approach between the network-side identity federation model
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Fig. 4 Client-side federation
and the client-centric identity one. It enables the user to fully control the fed-
eration aliases (preventing, this way, the IdP and the SPs to collude and mass-
correlate partial user identities they have) but leave the identity management
and the user authentication for IdPs in the network. As in the network-based
identity federation model, the SPs can, therefore, establish trust relationships
with these IdPs and accept the authentication claims they provide. This model
is a complementary approach with regard to the network-side and the client-
centric ones since it might be relevant in cases where the users could be
reluctant to entrust the management of the identity federation links to IdPs
in the network and where the SPs could refuse to trust authentication claims
provided by the users’ device. This could be typically the case if we want
to enable authentication and attribute sharing between domains like health,
government, bank... for which identities and services are deemed sensitive.
In the client-side identity federation model we propose, the IdP does not
know the aliases used to actually reference the users in the namespace of the
SPs. This property relies on the use of a so-called blind signature scheme.
This scheme enables a requester to ask a signer to sign a message without
revealing all parts of the message. The user can, therefore, ask the IdP to sign
an authentication response without revealing the alias referencing the user in
the SP’s namespace. The assumption, here, is that the IdP does not need to
know the actual alias used by the SP. The key requirement is that the identifier
contained in the authentication response the IdP signs must be stable for a
given user and a given SP (it must always be the same).
On the use of blind signature schemes
A blind signature scheme (Chaum 1982, 1983) is a cryptographic protocol that
allows a user to obtain a signature without giving the signer any information
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about the actual message. Moreover, even if the signer sees one of the
documents he has signed later on, he won’t be able to determine when and
for whom he has signed it.
But this is not exactly what we need in our context since, as said before, the
IdP does not only signs the alias but also the link between the alias, the user and
the SP. Moreover, the IdP necessarily knows (i) the user’s identity since the
role of the IdP is to authenticate users and (ii) the requested SP since the IdP
has to retrieve the right alias of the user (corresponding to this particular SP).
Consequently, the property of blind signature schemes is somewhat too
restrictive. We need that the resulting signed message includes necessary
information known by the signer: this is called a partially blind signature. The
message to be signed is, therefore, divided into two parts: the first part M will
be known by the signer whereas the second part m will be blinded (that is
unknown by the signer). In our context, the blinded part of the message the IdP
signs corresponds to the alias and may be some information embedded in the
authentication request (such as, again, the identifier of the request) whereas
the clear part will be in particular the service provider’s identity. But again this
is not enough in our context.
If we consider the SSO protocol, the IdP needs to sign the link between the
alias, the user and the SP several times (at each new authentication request)
but the (blind) alias must always be the same for a given couple (user, SP).
Moreover, as mentioned before, the authentication request includes a request
identifier, the date of the request and the identifier of the SP. The request
identifier or the date of request can be used by the IdP and the SP to cross
correlate the user’s identities. Thus, this information must not be revealed to
the IdP and must be different from one authentication request to another.
The message must, therefore, be divided into three parts: the first one is
known by the signer, the second one is blinded but needs to be invariable
and the final one is a “true” blinded message. More precisely, we need a new
type of partially blind signature scheme, that we call invariable partially blind
signature scheme. Having such building block, we can use it in our context with
the message being divided into the three following parts.
1. The first one corresponds to what the IdP needs to know such as the service
provider’s identity.
2. The second part differs from one authentication request to another and
corresponds to information that could be used by the IdP and SP for
cross-correlation (the authentication request identifier or the date of the
request).
3. The third part corresponds to the information that is invariable from
one authentication request to another. It corresponds to the blind alias.
Using invariable partially blind signature schemes, we thus obtain the new
federation model shown in Fig. 5.
The aim of the next section is to provide such partially blind signature
scheme. In Section “Client-side identity federation and SSO protocols”, we
will finally give the way to use it in our client-side identity federation solution.
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Fig. 5 Client-side identity
federation model
Invariable partially blind signature schemes
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of invariable partially blind
signature scheme (IPBS for short) and next give two different ways to obtain
such scheme.
Model for invariable partially blind signature schemes
An invariable partially blind signature scheme implies three different actors: a
user denoted U , a signer S and a verifier V . Each of them is implied in one or
several of the following procedures:
• Setup is an algorithm executed by e.g. the signer which takes on input a
security parameter λ and outputs the parameters param, the signer’s public
key spk and the corresponding private key ssk;
• Sign is a protocol between the user taking on input a message msg =
M‖m‖m∗, param and spk and the signer taking on input M, ssk, param
and spk. The user outputs a signature σ on the message msg while the
signer outputs its view viewS of the signing protocol, which includes the
blinded version mblind of m.
• ReSign is a protocol between the user taking on input a message msg =
M‖m‖m∗, param, spk and optionally the blind version mblind of the
message m and the signer taking on input M, mblind, ssk, param and spk.
The user outputs a signature σ on the message msg = M‖m‖m∗ while the
signer outputs its view viewS of the re-signing protocol, which includes the
blinded version mblind of m.
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• Verif is an algorithm executed by the verifier which on input a message
msg, a signature σ , param and spk outputs 1 if the signature σ on the
message msg is valid and 0 otherwise.
We can now focus on the security properties an invariable partially blind
signature scheme should verify. There are mainly four properties and if we
consider useless to formally describe the correctness one which simply describe
the fact that everything goes well with honest actors, it remains the three
following definitions.
• Unforgeability: the adversary against the unforgeability property is given
the signer’s public key spk and param and can successfully interact 1
(resp. 2) times with the signer in the Sign (resp. ReSign) protocol. The
adversary wins this unforgeability experiment if she successfully outputs
1 + 2 + 1 valid signatures. Thus, an invariable partially blind signature
scheme is unforgeable if for any polynomial-time adversary, her probability
of success is negligible.
• First partial blindness: the adversary against the first partial blindness
property is given the signer’s secret key ssk and param and can interact
with two honest users U0 and U1. At any time of the experiment, the adver-
sary outputs the following different messages M, m0‖m∗0 and m1‖m∗1. Then,
one bit b ∈ {0, 1} is randomly chosen and the adversary engages in two
Sign protocols with U0 (resp. U1) taking on input msgb = M‖mb‖m∗b (resp.
msgb¯ = M‖mb¯‖m∗b¯ ), param and spk. Next, the adversary is given the two
resulting signatures together with the corresponding message (σb ,msgb )
and (σb¯ ,msgb¯ ). Finally, the adversary outputs one bit b
′ ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, an
invariable partially blind signature scheme is first partially blind if for any
polynomial-time adversary, the probability that b ′ = b differs significantly
from 1/2 is negligible.
• Second partial blindness: the second partial blindness is define as the first
one, except that the adversary and the honest users U0 and U1 interactively
play a ReSign protocol. More precisely, the adversary is given the signer’s
secret key ssk and param and can interact with two honest users U0 and
U1. At any time of the experiment, the adversary outputs the following
different messages M, m˜0, m∗0, m˜1, and m
∗
1 such that m0blind and m1blind are
the blind version of the messages m0 and m1 that have been obtained by
U0 and U1 respectively in a previously played Sign protocol (we consider
that U0 and U1 have access to m0 and m1 respectively). Then, one bit
b ∈ {0, 1} is randomly chosen and the adversary engages in two ReSign
protocols with U0 (resp. U1) taking on input msgb = M‖m0‖m∗b (resp.
msgb¯ = M‖m1‖m∗b¯ ), param and spk. Next, the adversary is given the two
resulting signatures together with the corresponding message (σb ,msgb )
and (σb¯ ,msgb¯ ). Finally, the adversary outputs one bit b
′ ∈ {0, 1}. Thus,
an invariable partially blind signature scheme is second partially blind
if for any polynomial-time adversary, the probability that b ′ = b differs
significantly from 1/2 is negligible.
280 S. Canard et al.
Useful tools for our constructions
The basic cryptographic building blocks that will be needed for the design
of our IPBS are commitment schemes, signatures of knowledge and special
signature schemes (a.k.a. Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature schemes).
Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme allows a party to commit to a tuple (x1, x2, · · · , xn) of
(secret) values to another party. A commitment doesn’t reveal any (compu-
tational) information on the tuple to the other party (hiding property) and
prevents the committing party to change the values being committed to at
a later stage (biding property). For example if G is a cyclic group in which
the discrete logarithm problem is assumed to be hard and g1, g2, · · · , gn are n
random generators of G, then C = Commit(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = gx11 gx22 · · · gxnn is a
commitment on the tuple (x1, x2, · · · , xn).
Signatures of knowledge and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
In a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge a prover convinces a verifier that
she knows a witness w such that a predicate P is fulfilled without releasing
any further information on w. These interactive proofs can also be used non-
interactively (a.k.a signatures of knowledge) by using the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic (Fiat and Shamir 1986). In the sequel, we will use the following notation
NI Z K[(α, β, · · · ) : P] to denote a signature of knowledge proving that the
prover knows a tuple (α, β, · · · ) of secret values satisfying the predicate P. In
this notation, greek letters will denote the secret knowledge and the others
letters will denote public parameters between the prover and the verifier. For
example, NI Z K[α : h = gx] will denote a non-interactive proof of knowledge
of the discrete logarithm of h in the base g (see the Schnorr authentication
scheme below).
The Schnorr Authentication Scheme The Schnorr authentication scheme has
been introduced by Schnorr in Schnorr (1989). It permits a prover to prove
that she knows a discrete logarithm of a public key known by the verifier in a
group of prime order.
Let p and q be two primes such that q|(p − 1). Let G be a subgroup of
Z/pZ of order q and let g ∈ G. We suppose that the prover knows the discrete
logarithm x of h in base g. The authentication scheme is then described in
Fig. 6.
This interactive protocol can be turned non-interactively by using e.g. the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic (Fiat and Shamir 1986) that consists in first randomly
choosing w ∈ [0, q − 1], computing a = gw, then replacing the random choice
of c by the output of a secure hash function H on input g and a. The final
component of the non-interactive authentication is then r = w − cx (mod q).
Client-side approach for privacy-preserving identity federation 281






R [0, q – 1]
a = g
c R [0, 2k [
r = – cx (mod q)
a grhc?
Prover
The verification is done by checking that c = H(g‖grhc). This non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof is in the following denoted as NI Z K(x : h = gx).
The Chaum and Pedersen Variant of the Schnorr Authentication Scheme It
exists several variants of the Schnorr authentication scheme in the literature.
One is due to Brands (1993) and permits someone to prove that she knows the
representation (x1, · · · , xn) of a public value h in the base (g1, · · · , gn). Again,
the non-interactive version of this proof, using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, is
denoted by NI Z K((α1, · · · , αn : h = ∏ni=1 gαii ). This proof of knowledge is
detailed in Brands (1993).
Another one has been proposed by Chaum and Pedersen (1992). In this
latter, we consider that there exists a subgroup G of Z/pZ, where p is a prime
number, of order q where q is a prime such that q|(p − 1). Let us also consider
g and m two elements of G.
The prover owns a secret key x ∈ [1, q − 1] and computes her public keys
h = gx and z = mx. The aim of the Chaum and Pedersen protocol is to
provide a proof of knowledge of a secret that corresponds to both the discrete
logarithm of h is base g and the discrete logarithm of z in base m: this is a
proof of equality of two known discrete logarithms. This is done by choosing
at random w ∈ [0, q − 1], computing a = gw and b = mw and finally r = w − cx
(mod q) after receiving a random value c. (a, b , c, r) is valid iff a = grhc and
b = mrzc (see details in Fig. 7).
An Ad-hoc Version of the Chaum-Pedersen Scheme It exists many ways to
modify the above authentication protocols to transform it into a signature
scheme. The one we describe in the following is based on the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic (Fiat and Shamir 1986). Let p and q be two primes such that q|(p − 1).
Let G be a subgroup of Z/pZ of order q. Let g, g1, g2, g3 ∈ G. Let H and H1
be two secure hash functions.
The signer owns a private key x ∈ [0, q − 1] and publishes the corresponding
public key h = gx.
• Signature algorithm. Let msg be a message of the form M‖m‖m∗ where
M and m∗ are in {0, 1}∗ and m ∈ G such that the signer knows the discrete
logarithm of m in base g2. The signer acts has follow to sign msg. She first
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Fig. 7 Chaum-Pedersen
authentication scheme
chooses at random w ∈ [1, q − 1] and computes z = (gH(M)1 .m.g3)x, c =
H(M‖m∗‖m‖z‖gw‖(gH(M)1 mg3)w), r = w − cx (mod q) and finally a non-
interactive proof of knowledge P of the discrete logarithm of m in base
g2 using the Schnorr protocol (see above). The signature σ on msg is thus
(z, c, r, P).
• Verification algorithm. The verification of the signature (z, c, r, P) of a
message msg = M‖m‖m∗ is done by first verifying that P is valid and then
by checking that
c = H(M‖m∗‖m‖z‖grhc‖(gH(M)1 mg3)rzc).
This non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is denoted
NI Z K(x : h = gx ∧ z = mx).
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature schemes
These special signature schemes are proposed in Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
(2004) with in addition some specific protocols.
One of this protocol allows in particular that a signature be issued on
messages that are not known to the signer, but to which the signer only knows
a commitment. Informally, in a protocol for signing a committed value, we
have a signer with public key spk, and the corresponding secret key ssk, and a
user who queries the signer for a signature. The common input to the protocol
is a commitment C on secret values (x1, x2, · · · , xn) only known by the user.
In the end of the protocol, the user obtains a valid Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
signature  = CLSign(x1, x2, · · · , xn) and the signer learns nothing about
(x1, x2, · · · , xn).
Another protocol allows to prove knowledge of a signature on a tu-
ple of messages (x1, x2, · · · , xn) without releasing any information on the
corresponding signature. Each message can either be revealed to the ver-
ifier, he can know a commitment of it or have no information on it. It
is for example possible to prove knowledge of a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
signature on committed values. Using our notation, such a proof would
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be denoted by NI Z K[(α1, α2, · · · , αn, β) : C = Commit(α1, α2, · · · , αn) ∧ β =
CLSign(α1, α2, · · · , αn)].
A first construction based on the Chaum-Pedersen signature
Several blind signature schemes exist in the literature (Chaum 1982, 1983;
Camenisch et al. 1994; Abe 2001) but, as explained in the above section, we
need to provide a new construction, based on the model defined previously.
For this purpose, we use a generic way which permits to construct a blind
signature scheme by using as a primitive a discrete-log based zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge (ZKPK).
Description
We can now introduce our invariable partially blind signature we use to
improve the privacy of the identity federation of SAML 2.0 as it will be
described in Section “Client-side identity federation and SSO protocols”. For
this purpose, we turn the above Chaum-Pedersen signature scheme into a blind
version one where M is known by the signer and the blinded parts of the
message are m = gv2 (invariable data) and m∗ (variable data).
• Setup: let p and q be two primes such that q|(p − 1). Let G be a subgroup
of Z/pZ of order q. Let g, g1, g2, g3 ∈ G. Let H and H1 be two secure hash
functions. The secret key ssk of the signer is an integer x ∈ [1, q − 1] and
the corresponding public key spk is h = gx.
• Sign: in a nutshell, a user wanting to obtain a blind signature on a
message msg = M‖m‖m∗ has first to blind m = gv2 by choosing at random
s ∈ [1, q − 1] and computing mblind = m.gs. The signer, on input mblind,
computes m0 = gH1(M)1 mblindg3 and z0 = mx0 and proves, using the Chaum
and Pedersen signature scheme, that the discrete logarithm of h in base
g is the same as the discrete logarithm of z0 in base m0. The user finally
retrieves a true Chaum-Pedersen signature σ = (z, c, r, P2) on the message
msg as described above. The whole protocol is described more precisely in
Fig. 8.
• ReSign: this procedure is played similarly to the Sign one, except that this
is not necessary to send mblind anymore.
• Verif: the verification of the validity of a blind signature on a messagemsg
is done as described above for the Chaum and Pedersen signature scheme.
Security features
The security of our invariable partially blind signature scheme is given by the
three following propositions. The security proofs are provided in Appendix A
Security analysis of our first IPBS scheme.
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Fig. 8 The Chaum-Pedersen based IPBS scheme
Theorem 1 (Correctness) If both parties follow the protocol then σ =
(z, c, r, P2) is a valid Chaum-Pedersen signature on msg = M‖m‖m∗.
Theorem 2 (First and second partial blindness) For any common information
M, the signer’s view of the execution of the IPBS protocol is statistically
independent of the messages m and m∗ and the signature σ = (z, c, r, P2). As
a consequence, our IPBS scheme verifies the first and second partial blindness
properties.
Theorem 3 (Unforgeability) If there exists an adversary A against the unforge-
ability of our IPBS scheme, then A can be used to produce a signature forgery
of the Chaum-Pedersen blind signature scheme.
Another generic construction
Another possible way to design an invariable partially blind signature scheme
is to use the so-called Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature schemes, as intro-
duced above. More precisely, we would have the following description for CL




signature schemes based on elliptic curves and bilinear maps (see section 5 of
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (2004)).
• Setup: let G be a group of prime order q and g1, g2, g3, g4, g5 five genera-
tors in G. These data constitutes the public parameters. Let H, H1 and H2
be three secure hash functions. The signer owns a private key sk of a CL
signature scheme. The corresponding public key is denoted by pk.
• Sign: in order to obtain an invariable partially blind signature on a message
msg = M‖m∗ where M, m∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗, the user U will first choose three
random values a, b , r ∈ [1, q − 1] and computes a commitment C′ on a, b




will then computes two non-interactive proofs P1 and P2 in order to prove
that he knows the committed values P1 = NI Z K[(α1, α2) : C′ = gα11 gα22 ]
and P2 = NI Z K[(α3, α4) : C′′ = gα33 gα44 ] and send M, C′, C′′, P1 and P2 to
the signer S. The signer will verify the proofs P1 and P2 and if they are
valid, she will choose a random value s and compute the commitment C =
C′C′′gs3g
H2(M)
5 . S will then use her secret key sk to compute a Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature  on C (which is in fact a signature on the tuple
(a, b , r + s,H1(m∗),H2(M)). Finally, S will send s and  to U .
U will then computes D = ga1 and a non-interactive proof P3 that he knows
a signature on these committed values:
P3 = NI Z K[(α1, α2, α3, β) : D = gα11 ∧
β = CLSign(α1, α2, α3,H1(m∗),H2(M)].
The pair (D, P3) represents the invariable partially blind signature on
the message msg = M‖m∗. For our identity federation protocol D will
correspond to the federation alias and C′ to the blind alias. The whole
protocol is described more precisely in Fig. 9.
2The message M will be known by the signer whereas m∗ should be unknown to her.
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• ReSign: this step is simply derived from the above description and will not
be detailed in this paper.
• Verif: the verification of a signature is done by checking that the non-
interactive proof P3 is correct, using standard techniques.
Client-side identity federation and SSO protocols
As explained in the above sections, the aim of the identity federation approach
we propose is to enable the users to control the federation links between
their identities while leaving the actual user authentication to the IdPs in the
network.
The identity federation protocol
Again, the first time a user uses a particular IdP to authenticate to a SP, the
user may federate her SP’s identity to her IdP’s identity. In our proposal, the
reference given by the IdP to the SP with regard to a user is a blinded alias, as
described in Fig. 5. The global identity federation protocol is given in Fig. 10
and works as follow (the IdP plays the role of the signer in the underlying





• Verifies the signature




4. Blind Signature Process
• Associates aliasblind with user@idp




4. Blind Signature Process
Fig. 10 Our identity federation protocol
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1. The user accesses to a SP.
2. SP redirects the user to the IdP with AuthnRequest. This authentication
request is a standard SAML 2.0 authentication request that contains
in particular a request identifier, the date of the request and the SP’s
identifier. The request identifier and the date of the request should be
blinded (so the IdP cannot read them) since this information could be used
by the IdP and the SP to establish a link between the identities.
3. IdP verifies the validity of the authentication request and authenticates the
user.
4. The IdP determines that the user user@idp has not yet federated her
identity with her identity local to the SP. The IdP and the user then engage
in the invariable partially blind signature protocol given in the previous
section (see Fig. 8) with the following inputs.
• The message M contains the information the IdP is allowed to read
including the SP’s identity. As mentioned above the IdP will act as a
signer in the IPBS.
• The message m∗ is the information in the request/response that can be
used to identify the user, such as the request identifier or the date of
the request. This message is, therefore, blinded.
• The message m is the federation alias, computed as m = gv2 where v
is a random value chosen by the user (see Section “Implementation
considerations”). This message is blinded.
The IdP then associates the blinded alias to the local user identity and
the SP. At the end of the blind signature protocol, the user obtains an
authentication response AuthnResponse signed by the IdP (in other words
the user obtains from the IdP a valid signature on m∗ and the alias m). The
IdP only knows the blinded version of the alias (aliasblind) and has no way,
thanks to the property of the IPBS, to compute the unblind version (alias).
5. The user sends the signed authentication response to the SP. This au-
thentication response corresponds to a standard authentication response.
Only the signature of the authentication response differs from the standard
recommendations. The signature is composed of the following information
as mentioned previously: z value, c value, r value and P2.
6. SP verifies the IdP’s signature of the AuthnResponse and extracts alias.
SP then authenticates the user, retrieves the local identity user@sp and
associates it the federation alias alias.
7. Finally, SP gives the user the requested service. The identity user@idp of
the user at IdP is now federated to her identity user@sp at SP with the
federation alias alias.
Let us now focus on the step 4 dealing with the blind signature scheme
interactions between the user and the IdP. This step can be divided as follows.
1. The IdP sends to the user a BlindAliasRequest to begin the blind signature
protocol of Fig. 8.
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2. The user creates the alias by computing gs, blinds it by computing mblind
and sends it to the IdP, together with some other values corresponding to
m0 and the proof P1 that everything has been correctly computed. We can
consider here that the part M of the global message can be either sent by
the user to the IdP or directly generated by the IdP himself.
3. The next step corresponds to the exchange between the user and the signer
of the blind signature protocol until the user receives r0 from the IdP
(i.e. the signer). This is also at the end of this step that the IdP associates
the blinded alias mblind with user@idp. We could moreover interpret this
step as the generation and the signature by the IdP of the AuthnResponse.
This AuthnResponse including the blinded alias and a blind version of the
sensible information included in the authentication response is sent to the
user.
4. Finally, the user processes the AuthnResponse by unblinding the alias and
the blinded information in such a way that the signed AuthnResponse now
includes the actual federation alias.
The single sign on protocol
Once the identity federation is performed, the Single Sign On (SSO) is now
possible for this user and this service provider. The new SSO protocol is again
different from the identity federation one (Fig. 10) since the service provider
does not need to authenticate the user. The service provider uses the alias to
retrieve the identity of the user. More precisely, we have the following steps.
1. The user accesses to a SP
2. SP redirects the user to the IdP with AuthnRequest.
3. IdP verifies the validity of the authentication request and optionally au-
thenticates the user (authentication is not required if the user has already
authenticated and if the IdP maintains an authentication session locally).
IdP retrieves from his database the corresponding blinded alias for the
requested SP.
4. The IdP and the user then engage in the partially blind signature protocol.
More precisely, there is no need for the user to send mblind to the IdP
since the IdP already has it in its database. However, in the first part of
the blind signature protocol of Fig. 8, since the message M contains the
SP’s identity, the computation of m0 and P1 by the user are necessarily
done again. At the end of the protocol, the user obtains an authentication
response AuthnResponse signed by the IdP and containing the unblinded
alias.
5. The user sends the signed authentication response to SP.
6. SP verifies the IdP’s signature on AuthnResponse, extracts the embedded
alias and retrieves the local identity user@sp associated with the federation
alias alias.
7. The SP finally sends a response to the initial service request from the user.
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Implementation considerations
In this section, we first give some details on security aspects that need to
be studied for a practical implementation, and we give first results of the
performance measurements we have performed on our own implementation.
Details on the implementation
We first focus on implementation considerations by highlighting key aspects
that need to be considered in order to ensure that the users’ privacy is actually
protected and that no security flaw is introduced.
• The blind alias together with the local identity of the user at the IdP side
and the related SP should be stored in the user database of the IdP.
• In accordance with the SAML 2.0 specifications, the blind aliases should
be different from one SP to another for a particular user (this prevents
SPs from linking the partial identities they manage) and from one user to
another.
One possible idea is that the user and the IdP jointly generate this alias
m = gv2, such that two aliases are necessarily different. For example, m
could be equal to gv12 g
v2
2 where v1 is secretly chosen by the user and v2
is given by the IdP. It it moreover necessary for the user to prove, using
standard ZKPK, that the sent mblind is correctly formed using v1 and v2:
NI Z K(v1, s : mblind/gv22 = gv12 gs).• For a particular SP and for a given user, the authentication response should
always include the same alias except if one of the protagonist (user, SP or
IdP) asks for a different one.
• The user should be able to verify that the alias embedded in the authenti-
cation response is not the one related to an uncorrect SP. This case may
happen since this is the IdP who embeds the blinded alias in the blind
signature process of the SSO protocol. Note that this verification can be
easily done since the user can verify the IdP signature before sending the
authentication response to the SP. If the alias is not the right one, the
verification will fail since the user will not use the corresponding random
values (see below).
It is important to note that, contrary to some SAML 2.0 specifications that
are based on standard web browser, the approach we propose requires the
installation of a blind signature module at the client side.
Moreover, some information included in the identity federation protocol
needs to be used by the user during the SSO process. More precisely, the user
needs to reuse the random values implied in the blinding of the alias (this
is why we need a particular partially blind signature scheme, as explained in
Section “On the use of blind signature schemes”). Indeed, the random value
s used to blind the alias gv , chosen during the identity federation protocol
between the user and the IdP is also used during all future SSO protocols.
Thus, the user should have to store this value s. For this purpose, it is possible
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to use a single password pwd and a cryptographic function called HMAC.
Thus this random value can e.g. be s = HMAC(K, IdP, SP, pwd) such that
only one password is needed to compute all necessary values. The same type
of computations can also be used to pseudo-randomly choose the alias in such
a way that two aliases of a same user are different from one SP to another.
One solution to the problem of random generation and storage can be to
use a smart card, a dongle or a mobile phone to store the necessary values
and make the computations. This can be very useful to address mobility in the
client-side identity federation approach we propose.
First performance estimation
A prototype of this system has been implemented in Java, using a 32 bits Intel
centrino duo processor at 1.66 GHz and 2 Gbytes RAM for the client side and
an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU 5110 at 1.60 GHz for the providers.
We first consider the normal federated identity case without the blind
signature process, using a 2048-bits RSA signature scheme (with CRT), and
we obtain an overall running time of approximatively 300 ms.
We have implemented our first construction based on the Chaum-Pedersen
signature scheme, with a 1024-bits modulus. With this configuration, the
overall running time of the federation process or the SSO protocol is 1.1
s (measured from the browser). This includes the cryptographic part, the
exchanges, the message formatting (in PHP), the javascript execution, etc.
The cryptographic part needs nearly 240 ms and can be divided as follows:
• client-side: 155 ms, including 45 ms for the first part of the protocol, 50 ms
for the second part and optionally 60 ms to verify the obtained signature;
• IdP-side: 26 ms in total (the second step is quite immediate);
• SP-side: 60 ms to verify the signature.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a client-side identity federation approach that
complements the SAML 2.0 network-based identity federation model and the
client-centric identity model introduced with the identity selector concept. In
the network-side identity federation model, the users entrust the IdPs with the
management of the links between their identities. In the client-side identity
federation approach, the links between identities are managed at the client
side by the users themselves, providing, this way, a better protection of the
users’ privacy. Like the network-side approach, it prevents the SPs from mass-
correlating their databases. But in addition, it also prevents collusion between
IdPs and SPs that would enable a mass-correlation of identity databases.
Unlike the client-centric identity model, the authentications are performed
by the IdPs in the network which enables the SPs to maintain their trust
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relationships with these IdPs and to accept the authentication claims they
provide.
Our approach is based on the introduction of a new type of blind signature
scheme that we call invariable partially blind signature. It enables the user to
ask the IdP to sign authentication responses without revealing the federation
alias actually used by the SP. We give an example of such blind signature
scheme and apply it to our identity federation model.
Our client-side identity federation model complements the existing ap-
proaches. The users should be able to decide the most appropriate model
depending on the very nature of the identities to federate and on the trust
she puts on the IdPs. The network-side identity federation model is probably
more relevant for partial identities that are sightly independent (an identity at
Orange and an Identity at eBay for instance) and when the users put sufficient
trust in the IdPs (and the network) to entrust it with the management of
the federation links between these identities. On the contrary, the client-side
identity federation model might be chosen when the user wants to keep its
identities separate. This might be the case when the identities are such that
the damage that the correlation of these identities would cause is deemed
important (a federation between a bank identity and a government identity for
instance), and when the SPs refuse to trust authentications performed on the
users’ devices and to accept authentication claims provided by the IdP hosted
on these devices.
However, the client-side identity federation model requires that blind sig-
nature modules are installed on the user’s device. This type of cryptographic
primitive has been or should be integrated in client software like Higgins
or CardSpace through modules called Idemix (Camenish and Lysyanskaya
2001) and U-Prove (Brands 2000; Brands et al. 2007) respectively to improve
user privacy and protect the user personal information. Integrating a client-
side identity federation module in such client software seems to be relevant
and would provide the users with an even more seamless and consistent user
experience.
A Security analysis of our first IPBS scheme
Let us analyze, informally speaking, the security of the invariable partially
bind signature scheme described in Section “A first construction based on the
Chaum-Pedersen signature” (see Fig. 8).
A.1 Correctness
If both parties follow the protocol then σ = (z, c, r, P2) is a valid Chaum-
Pedersen signature on msg = M‖m‖m∗.
Let c = H(M‖m∗‖m‖z‖a‖b). We have to prove that
grhc = a and (gH(M)1 mg3)rzc = b .
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Thee first equality is proved as follows:
grhc = gur0+dhc0u = (gr0 hc0)ugd = au0 gd = a
For the second equality, we have:
(gH(M)1 mg3)
rzc = (m0/gs)r(z0/hs)c = (mr0zc0)/(gsrhsc)
= (mur0+d0 zc0u0 )/(grhc)s
= (mr00 zc00 )umd0/(grhc)s
= b u0md0/(grhc)s = b u0md0/as = b .
Therefore the verification condition
c = H(M‖m∗‖m‖z‖grhc‖(gH(M)1 mg3)rzc)
holds.
A.2 First and second partial blindness
For any common information M, the signer’s view of the execution of the
IPBS protocol is statistically independent of the messages m and m∗ and the
signature σ = (z, c, r, P2). As a consequence, our IPBS scheme verifies the first
and second partial blindness properties.
To prove that our IPBS protocol satisfies the partial blindness requirement,
we have to show that for every possible view and every possible signature (on
the same common information M) there exists exactly one triplet (u˜, d˜, s˜) of
blinding factors which would result in that particular signature and view.
Given any signer’s view consisting of M, mblind, a0, b 0, z0, c0, r0 and any
signature σ˜ = (z˜, c˜, r˜, P˜2) on a message m˜sg = M‖m˜‖m˜∗ (where m˜ = gv˜2), let
u˜ = c˜/c0 (mod q), d˜ = r˜ − u˜r0 (mod q) and s˜ denote the discrete logarithm of
mblind/m˜ in the base g (in other words mblind = gv˜2gs˜).
Let a′ = au˜0 gd˜ and b ′ = b u˜0md˜0/a′s˜.
It remains to show that:
a′ = a˜ = gr˜hc˜ (1)
b ′ = b˜ = m˜r˜uz˜c˜ (2)
where m˜u = gH(M)1 m˜g3 = m0/gs˜.
Let us first observe that since we assume that
(M, mblind, a0, b 0, z0, c0, r0)
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is a valid view and σ˜ = (z˜, c˜, r˜, P˜2) a valid signature on m˜sg = M‖m˜‖m˜∗, we
have:
a0 = gr0 hc0
b 0 = mr00 zc00
a˜ = gr˜hc˜
b˜ = m˜r˜uz˜c˜
z˜ = m˜xu = mx0/gs˜x = z0/hs˜
The last equation holds because the signer actually proves that z0 equals mx0
(and indirectly that z˜ = m˜xu) when making a blind signature.
Let us show that the first equality (1) holds:
a′ = au˜0 gd˜ = (gr0 hc0)u˜gr˜−u˜r0 = gr0u˜hc0u˜gr˜−u˜r0 = gr˜hc˜ = a˜.
For the second equality, we have:
b ′ = b u˜0md˜0/a′s˜ = (mr00 zc00 )u˜md˜0/(gr˜s˜hc˜s˜)
= (mr0u˜+d˜0 zc˜0)/(gr˜s˜hc˜s˜) = mr˜0zc˜0/(gr˜s˜hc˜s˜)
= (m0/gs˜)r˜(z0/hs˜)c˜ = m˜r˜uz˜c˜ = b˜ .
Consequently σ˜ = (z˜, c˜, r˜, P˜2) could have been produced during the ex-
ecution of the IPBS protocol which led to the view consisting of
M, mblind, a0, b 0, z0, c0, r0.
This completes the proof.
A.3 Unforgeability
If there exists an adversary A against the unforgeability of our IPBS scheme,
then A can be used to produce a signature forgery of the Chaum-Pedersen
blind signature scheme.
The unforgeability of the signatures produced by the IPBS protocol is an
immediate consequence of the security of the Chaum-Pedersen blind signature
scheme (Chaum and Pedersen 1992). Before showing that a signature forgery
of the Chaum-Pedersen blind signature scheme (CPBSS for short) “reduces”
to a signature forgery of our IPBS protocol, let us first recall how the CPBSS
works. Let p and q be two primes such that q|p − 1. Let G be a subgroup of
Z/pZ of order q and let g ∈ G. The secret key of the signer is an integer x ∈
[1, q − 1] and the corresponding public key is h = gx. To get a blind signature
on the messagemsg = (m∗, m) where m∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and m ∈ G, the user chooses
a random s ∈ [1, q − 1] and computes m0 = mgs. Let z0 = mx0. The signer then
proves that logg h = logm0 z0 as described in Fig. 11 below.
At the end of the protocol, the user retrieves a Chaum-Pedersen signature
σ = (z, c, r) on the message msg = (m∗, m). The signature is considered as
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Fig. 11 Chaum-Pedersen
blind signature scheme
valid iff c = H(m∗‖m‖z‖grhc‖mrzc). Note that if the execution of the protocol
is successful then this implies that z = mx.
We will also need for our reduction to slightly modify the Sign protocol
and the Verif algorithm of our IPBS. However, only the computation of the
challenge c and consequently the verification of the validity of a signature
are modified. The challenge in this variant of our IPBS is computed by the
user as follows: c = H(M‖m∗‖m‖gH1(M)1 mg3‖z‖grhc‖(gH1(M)1 mg3)rzc) (instead
of c = H(M‖m∗‖m‖z‖grhc‖(gH1(M)1 mg3)rzc)). Note that when the execution of
the protocol is successful we have z = (gH1(M)1 mg3)x.
Suppose we have an adversaryA who breaks the unforgeability of our IPBS
with non negligible probability. We can construct an algorithm B usingA as an
oracle, which breaks the unforgeability of the CPBSS. B receives on input from
its challenger (g, h = gx) the public key of the CPBSS and has oracle access to
a CPBSS signature oracle (denoted by OCP in the sequel). It also chooses a
secure hash function H1 as well as three random generators g1, g2, g3 of G and
sends its public key (g, g1, g2, g3, h = gx,H1) to A.
B now will have to answer to the signature requests (Sign or ReSign
requests) of A. For a Sign request B plays as follows (the simulation is similar
forReSign requests): when B will receive mblind, M, P1 fromA, it will compute
m0 = gH1(M)1 mg3 and sends this value toOCP.OCP will send back a0 = gw, b 0 =
mw0 , z0 = mx0 to B that B will transmit to A.
When B will receive the challenge c0 from A, B will transmit it to OCP. OCP
will send back a value r0 = w − c0x (mod q) to B that it will forward to A. B
therefore perfectly simulates the signer of the IPBS protocol.
Eventually A outputs (l1 + l2) + 1 valid distinct signatures (where l1 cor-
responds to the number of Sign requests and l2 to the number of ReSign
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requests): (msg1 =(M1, m∗1, m1), σ1), (msg2 =(M2, m∗2, m2), σ2), · · · , (msgl+1 =
(Ml+1, m∗l+1, ml+1), σl+1) where l = (l1 + l2).
Then (MSG1 =(M1‖m∗1‖m1‖gH1(M1)1 m1g3), σ1), (MSG2 =(M2‖m∗2‖m2‖
gH1(M2)1 m2g3), σ2), · · · , (MSGl+1 =(Ml+1‖m∗l+1‖ml+1‖gH1(Ml+1)1 ml+1g3), σl+1)
represent l + 1 valid signatures of the CPBSS although only l signatures have
been requested to OCP. B has therefore broken the unforgeability property of
the CPBSS.
We have shown that if there exists an adversary A that can produce
l + 1 signatures after having requested only l signatures to the signer of
our IPBS scheme (one-more unforgeability) then A can straightforwardly be
used to produce a signature forgery of the Chaum-Pedersen blind signature
scheme. As the later scheme is conjectured to be one-more unforgeable
(see Brands 1993) such an adversary cannot exist. A detailed security analysis
of the Chaum-Pedersen blind signature scheme can be found in Brands (1993).
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